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CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ: 
LEGAL ISSUES, ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
ALICIA M. LENDON 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the most universal and fundamental aspects of college life for students is 
the ability to join and participate in a variety of student organizations.  Most schools 
provide specific guidelines for potential groups to follow in order to gain formal 
recognition from the school.  Because these organizations are de facto extensions of, and 
representative of, the school with which they are affiliated, schools have an interest in the 
nature and composition of the organizations.   
 In recent years, government recognition and protection of gays and lesbians has 
grown through a variety of channels.  While the United States Supreme Court’s 2003 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas
1
 is widely considered the most progressive step in the gay 
rights’ movement, it was the 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans2 that initially cleared the 
way for widespread inclusion of “sexual orientation” as a protected classification in 
nondiscrimination policies.  However, because of the sensitivity of the issue of 
homosexuality in many religions, new issues have arisen at the cross-section of First 
Amendment religious protections and nondiscrimination laws.  “Several major religions 
in America teach that homosexuality is wrong by divine mandate and conclude that they 
                                                     
1
 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and struck down Texas’s (and similar laws in other states) anti-
sodomy law as an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
substantive due process. 
2
 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The state of Colorado placed Amendment 2 on its ballot, which would 
have prevented any state or local agency from including sexual orientation in its 
nondiscrimination policies, or taking any actions recognizing homosexual persons as a protected 
class.  The Supreme Court struck down the amendment as an unconstitutional violation of equal 
protection using only a rational basis standard. 
1 
 
cannot support social and legal trends favorable to homosexuals without ignoring the 
commands of the God they worship.”3  With a growing number of state and local 
governments banning discrimination based on sexual orientation, a conflict arises.  In 
particular, the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez
4
 to resolve some of the lingering issues surrounding the conflict 
between religion and sexual orientation. 
    This case touches on a variety of legal principles that overlap and intertwine 
with each other.  Among them are First Amendment freedoms of speech and expressive 
association, the various “forums” that a government creates for the expression of speech, 
viewpoint-discrimination versus viewpoint-neutrality, and whether the government must 
subsidize constitutionally protected freedoms.  This paper will explain these legal 
principles and provide each side’s legal arguments.  Additionally, it will attempt to 
distinguish this particular situation from previous Supreme Court jurisprudence, and 
determine how the Court is likely to decide. 
 In Part I of this paper, it provides a historical background of the policies and 
events that this case evolved from.  In Subsection A, it explains the process a group of 
students must go through to become a Registered Student Organization at the University 
of California-Hastings College of Law, and provides the text of the policies that must be 
adopted.  In Subsection B, it describes the initial recognition and subsequent changes in 
the Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society that spurred this litigation, and in 
Subsection C it details the procedural history of the case. 
                                                     
3
 J. Brady Brammer, Religious Groups and the Gay Rights Movement: Recognizing Common 
Ground, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2006). 
4
 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, No. 08-1371 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2009). 
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 Part II of the paper presents the different legal issues that this case entails, 
beginning with the Christian Legal Society’s positions in Part A.  Part B lays out the 
positions of Respondents University of California-Hastings and Hastings Outlaw.  Then, 
Part III, Subsection A sorts through both arguments and uses Supreme Court precedent to 
predict the outcome of the case.  In Subsection B, the paper addresses some tangential 
areas of law this decision will likely affect, and concludes. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  University of California-Hastings College of Law’s Registered Student 
Organizations 
 
As do most law schools and universities, The University of California-Hastings 
College of Law (“Hastings”), has a procedure for allowing students to form extra-
curricular organizations.
5
  Purpose, size and interests of these groups vary greatly, but 
schools encourage students to participate to enhance their academic endeavors through 
additional social and educational opportunities.
6
 Hastings provides certain benefits to 
officially recognized student organizations.
7
 Such benefits include the ability to apply for 
funding from the school, use of school space for meetings and events, access to school-
wide communication such as email listservs and bulletin boards, and recognition in 
                                                     
5
 Brief of Hastings College of the Law Respondents at 3, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 
08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010). [hereinafter Hastings]. 
6
 Brief on the Merits for Respondent-Intervenor Hastings Outlaw at 2, Christian Legal Soc’y v. 
Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010).  [hereinafter Outlaws]. 
7
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 3. 
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school publications.
8
  However, limited access to some of these benefits is available to 
non-registered organizations as well.
9
   
At Hastings, a registered student organization (RSO) must meet several basic 
requirements for its application to be approved:  (1) it cannot be a commercial 
organization, (2) its membership must be limited to Hastings students, and (3) it must 
“agree to abide by [Hastings’] policies and regulations, including its longstanding 
nondiscrimination policy.”10  The policy, which has been in place since 1990, states,  
The College is committed to a policy against legally 
impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory 
practices.  All groups, including administration, faculty, student 
governments, College-owned student residence facilities and 
programs sponsored by the College, are governed by this policy 
of nondiscrimination.  The College’s policy on 
nondiscrimination is to comply fully with applicable law.  
 
The University of California, Hastings College of the Law shall 
not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual 
orientation.  This nondiscrimination policy covers admission, 
access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and 
activities.
11
  
  
Hastings requires its nondiscrimination policy be included in each group’s bylaws or 
constitution, and actually goes above and beyond the stated policy by requiring that RSOs 
explicitly state all students must be welcomed as members of each RSO.
12
  Specifically, 
the school “requires that [RSOs] allow any student to participate, become a member, or 
                                                     
8
 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 
2010). [hereinafter Christian Legal Society]. 
9
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 4. 
10
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 4. 
11
 Id.  The policy is also written in Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 9. 
12
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 6. 
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seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of their status and beliefs.”13  
Some, limited circumstances allow for membership limitations, but only if the 
requirements are completely neutral, and the initial opportunity is available to all 
students.
14
  Such acceptable circumstances include attendance requirements or baseline 
academic criteria.
15
   
 At the time this lawsuit was filed, Hastings had approximately 60 RSOs.
16
  The 
types of groups granted RSO status varied widely, including political groups, academic 
groups, social groups, athletic groups and professional groups.
17
  Additionally, there were 
three religious groups at the time that the Christian Legal Society filed its petition to 
become an RSO, the Muslim Law Students, the Jewish Law Students, and Hastings 
Koinonia.
18
  Each of the described groups had open membership policies and included 
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy in its bylaws.19 
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy is standard, and similar policies are in place at 
law schools throughout the United States.  The Association of American Law Schools 
(“AALS”), which is comprised of 171 schools,20 encourages member schools to “provide 
equality of opportunity in legal education for all,” and Bylaw §6-3(a) of AALS contains 
the group’s sexual orientation-inclusive nondiscrimination policy.21  Each member school 
                                                     
13
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 5. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id.  This is also mentioned in Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 3. 
17
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 5.  See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 3, and Christian Legal Society, 
supra note 8, at 3. 
18
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 5. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools in Support of Respondents at 1, 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010). [hereinafter AALS]. 
21
 Id. at 2.  The policy does include an exception for religiously affiliated schools; however, 
because Hastings is a public, secular institution, it is not relevant to the discussion at hand. 
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is free to make its own determination in how to apply this standard to its student 
organizations.
22
    Similarly, the American Bar Association (“ABA”), a legal professional 
organization of over 400,000, encourages its group members to prohibit discrimination 
on a variety of grounds.
23
  Its bylaws read, “[t]he Division shall not discriminate on the 
basis of ancestry, color, or race; cultural or ethnic background; economic disadvantage; 
ideological, philosophical or political belief or affiliation; marital or parental status; 
national or regional origin; physical disability; religion, or religious or denominational 
affiliation; sex; sexual orientation; or age.”24  Further, the ABA encourages its members 
to prohibit use of facilities or gatherings to organizations that discriminate on any of these 
bases.
25
 
At the time this lawsuit was filed, Christian Legal Society was the only group at 
Hastings whose petition to become an RSO had been denied.
26
  However, the Christian 
Legal Society was also the only group to ever seek to exclude Hastings’ 
nondiscrimination policy from its bylaws and to preclude certain persons from obtaining 
full membership status on the basis of identity or beliefs.
27
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
22
 AALS, supra note 20, at 2. 
23
 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Respondents at 2, Christian 
Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010).  [hereinafter ABA]. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. at 3. 
26
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 4. 
27
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 7. 
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B. History of the Christian Legal Society at Hastings 
The Christian Legal Society is a national organization, founded in 1961, that 
allows a variety of persons in the legal profession to engage in fellowship and gain 
“moral and spiritual guidance.”28  The Christian Legal Society has chapters at law 
schools throughout the country.
29
  From the Fall 1994 semester until the Spring 2002 
semester, there was an RSO called the Hastings Christian Legal Society; however, it was 
not affiliated with the national organization,
30
 and it abided by all Hastings’ rules and 
regulations.
31
  In 2002, the group changed its name to Hastings Christian Fellowship.
32
 At 
that time it had a policy that explicitly stated that “all students” were welcome as leaders 
and voting members.
33
  In fact, during the 2003-2004 school year, an openly gay female 
student was a voting member of the Hastings Christian Fellowship.
34
 
At the beginning of the 2004-2005 academic year, Hastings Christian Fellowship 
again became the Christian Legal Society, and sought to become an affiliated chapter of 
the national Christian Legal Society.
35
  In order to be recognized by the national chapter, 
the organization was required to adopt the national organization’s policies and bylaws.36  
One particular policy that the national Christian Legal Society requires is that all students 
sign a “Statement of Faith” to be a fully recognized member.37  Any student that does not 
sign, or abide by, the Christian Legal Society’s Statement of Faith would not be allowed 
                                                     
28
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
29
 Id. at 5. 
30
 Id. at 7. 
31
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
32
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8. 
33
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 6. 
34
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8. 
35
 Id.  See also Hastings, supra note 6 at 6. 
36
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8.  See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9. 
37
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 6.  See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9. 
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to vote for, or become, leaders within the organization.
38
  The relevant portion of the 
Statement of Faith, in conflict with Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy, says that,  
[i]n view of the clear dictates of Scripture, unrepentant 
participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is 
inconsistent with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith, and 
consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an 
individual from CLS membership.
39
 
 
 After being notified by Hastings Director of Student Services of the school’s 
requirements to become an RSO,
40
 the Christian Legal Society filed an application for 
recognition.
41
  The constitution the Christian Legal Society submitted did not include 
religion or sexual orientation in its nondiscrimination policy, and the school notified the 
group that it was not in compliance with Hastings’ requirements to become an RSO.42  
The group refused to make the requested changes to its constitution, and asked the school 
for an exemption from the policy through a letter written by the national Christian Legal 
Society organization.
43
  The Christian Legal Society was then formally denied its 
application to become an RSO, but was notified by the school that it would still be 
allowed to use Hastings facilities for its meetings, and could advertise its events on 
classroom chalkboards and general bulletin boards.
44
  The Christian Legal Society did not 
request to use Hastings facilities during the 2004-2005 year.
45
  Subsequent to the 
                                                     
38
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9. 
39
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. 
argued Apr. 19, 2010).  [hereinafter Petition for Writ]. 
40
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 8. 
41
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 9. 
42
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 11.  See also Outlaws, supra note 6, at 10. and 
Hastings, supra note 5, at 6. 
43
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 10.  See also Christian Legal Society, supra note 8 at 11. 
44
 Outlaws, supra note 6 at 11-12. 
45
 Id. at 11. 
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decision, Hastings revoked a $250 grant of travel funds it had previously approved for the 
group.
46
 
C. The Case’s Procedural History 
The Christian Legal Society filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California shortly after it was formally denied its RSO 
petition.
47
  The Christian Legal Society’s complaint alleged that its First Amendment 
rights to free association, free speech, free exercise of religion, and its right to equal 
protection had been violated.
48
  After an amended complaint was filed, another RSO—
Hastings Outlaw—successfully petitioned the court to become an Intervenor-
Respondent.
49
  Outlaw’s mission in intervening is to “protect the interests of its members 
and of other gay, lesbian and bisexual students who wish to attend law school in an 
environment free from discrimination and who wish to have an equal opportunity to 
become members of any registered student organization without regard to sexual 
orientation.”50   
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, and the District Court ruled in 
favor of the Respondents, finding that the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment 
rights were not violated.
51
  The District Court found that Hastings’ nondiscrimination 
policy did not violate the Christian Legal Society’s right to free speech because it 
                                                     
46
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 6. 
47
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 12.  See also Hastings, supra note 5, at 13. 
48
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 12.  See also Hastings, supra note 5, at 13. 
49
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 15. 
50
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 12-13. 
51
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 15.  See also Hastings, supra note 5, at 14 and 
Outlaws, supra note 6, at 13. 
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regulated conduct, not speech.
52
  Additionally, the Court determined that, even if the 
policy directly prohibited particular speech, Hastings had created a “limited public 
forum,” and because the policy is both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, it does not 
infringe on the Christian Legal Society’s rights.53   
On its claim of infringement on its right to free association, the District Court 
determined that official recognition by Hastings was not required for the group to 
function and associate fully, as evidenced by its existence during the 2004-2005 school 
year.
54
  The group’s right to exclude any persons from its group had not been infringed 
upon.  Rather, Hastings has simply created a set of requirements to gain school funds.
55
  
The Christian Legal Society claimed that the group was denied RSO status specifically 
because of its religious beliefs; however, the District Court found that evidence supported 
the exact opposite conclusion.
56
  Previously, for ten years, the school had recognized this 
exact group; the school did not refuse recognition until failed to adopt Hastings’ 
nondiscrimination policy.
57
 
The Christian Legal Society appealed the District Court’s decision to the Ninth 
Circuit, where the court affirmed the decision in a two-sentence, unpublished opinion.
58
  
Citing a recent Ninth Circuit decision,
59
 the Court held that the conditions for recognition 
                                                     
52
 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at 17. 
53
 Id. at 34-45. 
54
 Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27341 at 51. 
55
 Outlaws, supra note 6, at 14. 
56
 Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27341 at 42. 
57
 Id. at 43. 
58
 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2009). 
59
 Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008).  In this case, a group of Christian 
students wished to form a chartered club at Kentridge High School called “Truth.”  Truth filed 
several charters with the Associated Student Body (“ASB”) for approval; they were all either 
denied or not acted upon.  When the third and final charter was denied, the ASB gave four 
reasons for denying the charter: 1) the name “Truth” indicated that the ASB believed that group’s 
10 
 
were both viewpoint neutral and reasonable, and did not violate the Christian Legal 
Society’s First Amendment rights.60  Subsequently, the Christian Legal Society petitioned 
the Supreme Court of the United States, and the writ of certiorari was granted.
61
 
 
II. THE LEGAL ISSUES AND POSITIONS FACING THE COURT 
A. Christian Legal Society’s Arguments before the Supreme Court 
In The Christian Legal Society’s Petition to the Supreme Court for Writ of 
Certiorari,
62
 they relied heavily on the notion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision63 created a 
circuit split.
64
  The Christian Legal Society contends that in Christian Legal Society v. 
Walker,
65
 the Seventh Circuit came to a “diametrically opposite result” from the decision 
                                                                                                                                                              
religion was the only accurate one, 2) the group could not require students to sign a Statement of 
Faith prior to gaining voting privileges within the group, 3) the group’s divided membership 
classifications did not comply with school policy, and 4) the ASB feared that approving a 
religious club in school would violate the “separation of church and state.”  After it was denied, 
the group filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Washington.  Though the 
court did not come to a decision on several of Truth’s claims, the court held that Truth’s First 
Amendment rights were not violated by the school’s actions.  The school’s enforcement of its 
nondiscrimination policy, by not allowing the group to discriminate based on religion in shaping 
its membership, was constitutionally permissible. 
60
 Hastings, supra note 5, at 15. 
61
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8 at 17. 
62
 Petition for Writ, supra note 39. 
63
 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645. 
64
 Petition for Writ, supra note 39, at 18. 
65
 453 F.3d 853 (7
th
 Cir. 2006).  Southern Illinois University School of Law revoked official 
student organization status from the Christian Legal Society after determining that it was not in 
compliance with the school’s nondiscrimination policy.  Specifically, the group required students 
to agree to abide by a statement of faith to become voting members or leaders within the group.  
Included in the statement of faith is a disavowment of certain sexual practices, which ultimately 
excluded homosexual students from obtaining full membership status in the group.  The Christian 
Legal Society filed suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and the District 
Court denied the group’s request for a preliminary injunction, requiring the school to grant them 
recognition.  The Seventh Circuit, however, overturned the District Court and found for the 
Christian Legal Society, holding that enforcement of the school’s nondiscrimination policy was a 
violation of the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment rights. 
11 
 
reached in the lower court of this case.
66
  It is the Christian Legal Society’s contention 
that “Walker is on all fours with this case,” and thus, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding for 
Hastings.
67
 
Additionally, much of The Christian Legal Society’s arguments are based upon 
three cases from the Supreme Court, Healy v. James,
68
 Rosenberger v. Rector of the 
University of Virginia,
69
 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.
70
  The Christian Legal 
Society contends that its RSO denial severely burdens its ability to freely express its 
religious beliefs, and violates its First Amendment right of freedom of association and 
speech.
71
  Largely dependent on the belief that Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy is 
                                                     
66
 Petition for Writ, supra note 39, at 18. 
67
 Id. at 19-20. 
68
 408 U.S. 169 (1972).  Students sought to form a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society 
(“SDS”) at Central Connecticut State College, and were denied official recognition.  Recognition 
would allow the group access to school facilities and advertisement methods.  The school stated 
that they group had not been able to provide enough evidence they were independent of the 
national SDS group, which often engaged in disruptive and violent behavior.  After the District 
Court held that the denial did not violate the students’ freedom of association rights, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that the petitioners had a 
valid First Amendment right to freely associate, and that the burden for restricting this right was 
on the school to prove its justification was compelling and necessary. 
69
 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  Rosenberger, a student, requested funds from the University of Virginia 
for printing costs of a Christian-focused newspaper.  After the school denied the requests and the 
District Court and Court of Appeals affirmed the school’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed.  
The Court held that because the University funded other newspapers, including some with 
religious content, that this denial constituted viewpoint discrimination, and violated 
Rosenberger’s First Amendment right to free speech.  The school was free to deny publication 
funding based on content, but not based on viewpoint. 
70
 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  After the Boy Scouts of America revoked a scoutmaster’s (Dale’s) 
membership because of his homosexuality, Dale filed suit, and the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that New Jersey public accommodation law required the Boy Scouts to include homosexuals 
in its group.  The New Jersey courts held that Dale’s inclusion did not violate the Scouts’ First 
Amendment right to freedom of association because it did not affect the group’s purpose, and it 
did not require the group endorse any particular message.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed, and held for the Boy Scouts, stating that the group had a legitimate reason to 
support a specific moral code that did not include homosexual activity, and to force the group to 
accept open homosexuals as troop leaders sent a message contrary to the one it wished to proffer.  
This violated the group’s right to freedom of association. 
71
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 2. 
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viewpoint discriminatory, the Christian Legal Society contends that Hastings does not 
further a compelling government interest, and that it unconstitutional.
72
  Additionally, the 
Christian Legal Society asserts that Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy is counterintuitive 
to the school’s overarching goals, and especially burdensome on small or religiously 
affiliated student organizations.
73
 
The Christian Legal Society disputes the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that Hastings’ 
policy affects only conduct, rather than speech, and that the policy indeed violates the 
group’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.74  In order to deny a group access 
to a speech forum, it contends, the school bears the burden
75
 and must prove that the 
denial is narrowly applied and serves a “compelling state interest.”76  While it would, 
indeed, be in the school’s interest to not violate the First Amendment principles 
prohibiting the government from establishing a religion, Hastings need not worry about 
this, as it explicitly requires RSOs to acknowledge that they are independent of the 
college and are not sponsored by Hastings.
77
  Additionally, Christian Legal Society 
proffers that the school’s own policy states that it should “ensure an ongoing opportunity 
for the expression of a variety of viewpoints… in accordance with the highest standards 
                                                     
72
 Id. at 42-43. 
73
 Id. at 53. 
74
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 35. 
75
 Id. at 21. 
76
 Id., quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).  The University of Missouri 
revoked the right of a Christian group—Cornerstone—to use school rooms for worship and other 
meetings, on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  The 
Supreme Court held that the University had created a “limited public forum,” and thus, could not 
infringe on the group’s right to freedom of speech and association.  In this case, those rights 
outweighed the establishment clause.  The Court held that in a limited public forum, a school may 
not discriminate based on protected classifications of persons and identities, and that only 
content-based discrimination, rather than viewpoint discrimination, was permissible. 
77
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 23. 
13 
 
of… freedom of expression.”78  By requiring the Christian Legal Society to accept 
members that did not comport with its religious convictions, its right to freedom of 
expression, speech, and association was being violated.
79
 
While the District Court found that the Christian Legal Society’s continued 
existence served as evidence that its rights to freedom of association had not been 
violated,
80
 the Christian Legal Society argues that these restrictions are indeed 
burdensome on the group’s First Amendment rights.81  As the Supreme Court noted in 
Healy, official recognition is “vital” to a student group’s ability to function properly,82 
and the group’s ability to access traditional forms of student communication is a 
substantial need to be an effective group.
83
  Further, a group’s ability to find alternate 
meeting locations and engage in its expressive conduct elsewhere does not alleviate 
Hastings’ violations of the First Amendment.84  According to the Christian Legal Society, 
because Hastings’ policy is viewpoint discriminatory and burdensome on Christian Legal 
Society, the school must prove that its limitations are reasonable and are the “least 
restrictive means” of proving its purpose.85  It is the Christian Legal Society’s position 
that Hastings does not have a compelling interest in enforcing its nondiscrimination 
                                                     
78
 Id. at 2-3. 
79
 Id. at 27-29. 
80
 Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at 58-59. 
81
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 23. 
82
 Id.  See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972). 
83
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 24. 
84
 Id.  See also Healy, 408 U.S. at 182-183; Widmar, 464 U.S. at 288; and Board of Education 
v.Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990). 
85
 Christian Legal Society, supra note 8, at 26. 
14 
 
policy against the Christian Legal Society, but that even if it did, it is overly restrictive 
and, therefore, unconstitutional.
86
 
The Christian Legal Society argues that its freedom of association is infringed 
upon because, if it expresses it fully, the University withholds benefits it would otherwise 
be entitled to.
87
  Additionally, it claims that Hastings’ policy “interfere[s] with the 
internal organization.”88  The Christian Legal Society states that, particularly for religious 
and other small student organizations, to mandate that an RSO open its leadership 
positions to any member of the student body dilutes the group’s ability to express its 
message and create an environment where its own religious beliefs can be adequately 
discussed and taught.
89
  If Christian Legal Society is forced to allow any person, without 
regard to religious beliefs, become a leader in the group, it will not be able to ensure that 
the message comports with the original intention of the group.
90
  Small groups, such as 
the Christian Legal Society, are especially susceptible to a “takeover” by students who 
disagree with its religious beliefs, because a smaller number of students would be 
necessary to ensure that rogue students are selected to leadership positions.
91
 
If the controlling Hastings policy is that of the written nondiscrimination policy, 
then religious groups—such as the Christian Legal Society—are the only groups required 
                                                     
86
 Id. at 21. 
87
 Id. at 26. 
88
 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-623 (1984).  The United States Jaycees limited full 
membership opportunities to men between the ages of 18 and 35.  After two chapters began 
admitted women in accordance with a local nondiscrimination law, the national organization 
revoked their charters, and the chapters sued.  The Supreme Court found that the organization 
was not of the kind usually afforded First Amendment protection for freedom of association.  
However, even if were, the members’ rights were not sufficiently infringed upon, and the State’s 
compelling justification for enforcing its nondiscrimination laws prevailed. 
89
 Christian Legal Society, surpra note 8, at 27-30. 
90
 Id. at 30. 
91
 Id. at 29. 
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to allow persons who hold fundamentally different beliefs to partake fully in the 
organization.
92
  The Christian Legal Society uses the Hastings Democratic Caucus as an 
example of a group that can discriminate against persons that hold beliefs that contradict 
the goals of the mission.
93
  Under the written policy, discrimination based on political 
affiliation is not one of the enumerated prohibitions.
94
  Therefore, religious groups’ 
associations are required to abide by a limitation that no other type of group faces:  the 
insistence that it accept voting members who do not comport with the underlying 
objective in creating the group.
95
  This is viewpoint discrimination.
96
 
 Hastings denied Christian Legal Society’s application on the basis that it 
discriminated on both religion and sexual orientation.
97
  The Christian Legal Society 
claims that the sexual orientation provision is equally discriminatory based on 
viewpoint.
98
  The Christian Legal Society’s Statement of Faith that is in contradiction 
with Hastings’ policy requires that all persons disavow any sexual activity outside of 
marriage.
99
  Because the Christian Legal Society’s restriction is not merely based on 
conduct or attraction, but rather conduct combined with a specific belief that the behavior 
is morally acceptable, the Christian Legal Society alleges that the policy infringes on the 
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group’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression.100  No other type of group is 
prohibited from ensuring its leadership comports with its beliefs and principles.
101
 
 The final primary argument for the Christian Legal Society addresses Hastings’ 
alternative interpretation of its RSO requirement: that organizations abide by an “all-
comers” policy.102  Hastings’ written policy lists specific groups of persons that cannot be 
discriminated against in the membership or leadership decisions of an RSO.
103
  However, 
Hastings maintains that, once put into effect, the school provides that its 
nondiscrimination policy is actually broader than the written enumeration of definable 
characteristics.  Rather, all RSOs are required to admit any student to all levels of its 
membership.
104
  According to the Christian Legal Society, there are two policies: 1) the 
official, written policy, and 2) the unofficial interpretation the school has applied.
105
  To 
the Christian Legal Society, the broader policy is even more counterintuitive and 
unconstitutional than Hastings’ written policy.106  Even if the Court finds that the policy 
is viewpoint neutral, it cannot be said to be reasonable.
107
  Further, such a policy would 
prove contrary to Hastings’ stated goals of recognizing and fostering a variety of student 
groups.  “Free association, including the right to exclude, better facilitates the goal of 
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promoting an exchange of ideas; it protects the seedbeds where ideas emerge and mature 
in the first place.  There can be diversity of viewpoints in a forum if groups are not 
permitted to form around viewpoints.”108  Not only would students with diametrically 
opposite views have the opportunity to sabotage groups with opposing opinions, indeed, 
organizations would simply merge into broad topics, and  would “defeat[] the very 
purpose of recognizing any group as a group in the first place.”109 
 The Christian Legal Society argues that denial of official recognition by Hastings 
has placed a severe burden on the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment freedoms.  
By denying the Christian Legal Society generally available funds and methods of 
communication, Hastings has unconstitutionally discriminated against the Christian Legal 
Society because of its students’ religious and moral beliefs.  The group further claims that 
because the school is a public forum and it does not provide a compelling justification, it 
must grant the Christian Legal Society recognition. 
B. Hastings’ and the Hastings Outlaw’s Arguments Before the Supreme Court 
In response to the Christian Legal Society’s claims against Hastings, the school 
and Respondent Intervenor Hastings Outlaw (“Outlaw”) maintain that Hastings’ open-
membership policy for recognizing RSOs is a constitutional pre-requisite for certain 
school benefits.
110
  Specifically, because Hastings has created a limited public forum, it 
must only prove that its stipulations are viewpoint-neutral, reasonable given the purpose 
of the public forum, and non-coercive.
111
  While the Christian Legal Society contends 
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that the RSO forum is an “open speech forum,”112 the Outlaws argue that the forum is 
indeed limited in its very nature.
113
  Because the law school is offering otherwise 
inaccessible resources to persons that meet a particular set of criteria for “a particular 
purpose,” they have created a constitutional limited forum.114 
 The Christian Legal Society offers two interpretations of the exact policy 
Hastings proffers for RSO memberships: the written policy, which enumerates qualities 
that may not be used as a basis for discrimination, and the “spoken” policy, which 
requires an “open membership” to all students.115  Hastings argues that, regardless of the 
precise interpretation of the policy, it is viewpoint-neutral.
116
  The school’s open-
membership, or all-comers, policy is “quintessentially viewpoint-neutral” because it 
applies uniformly as a prerequisite for obtaining RSO status.
117
  The grant of RSO status 
to many religious organizations, including the Christian Legal Society prior to its 
adoption of new bylaws, underscores Hastings’ neutrality in enforcing its non-
discrimination policy.
118
  Though the Christian Legal Society’s religious beliefs do not 
comport with Hastings’ non-discrimination policy, and this led to the denial of its RSO 
application, Hastings had not violated the Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment 
rights.  The school is not obligated to subsidize the Christian Legal Society’s 
discriminatory conduct excluding gays and lesbians from leadership positions of 
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discrimination if its non-discrimination policy is uniformly applied.
119
  However, if the 
court applies the “written” non-discrimination policy, it is equally viewpoint-neutral.120   
 Further, Hastings and Outlaw argue that the policy is reasonable in light of the 
goals and intent in creating the limited public forum.
121
  Hastings’ goal in fostering many 
RSOs is to ensure that all students have access to a wide variety of groups that develop 
educational, leadership and social skills.
122
  Here, the money allocated to RSOs comes 
from a student activity fund that all students pay into.
123
  Because all Hastings students 
contribute, it follows that it is a reasonable requirement that all activities the funds are 
used for are open to all students.
124
  Further, California state law mandates that public 
universities abide by a nondiscrimination policy
125
 that includes both religion and sexual 
orientation for all activities using public funds or facilities.
126
  In opposition to the 
Christian Legal Society’s suggestion that an open-membership policy will result in 
“hostile takeovers” from persons that share views or beliefs inapposite, Outlaw points out 
that the version of the Christian Legal Society that was an RSO for ten years had no such 
experience with its open-membership policy; further, in the twenty-plus years Hastings 
has had RSOs with open-membership requirements, nothing of this sort has taken 
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place.
127
  Thus, Hastings’ insistence that RSOs comply with the same policy is 
reasonable.   
 Hastings argues that once a limited forum is established, the Supreme Court of the 
United States established first in Grove City College v. Bell
128
 that First Amendment 
rights are not infringed upon through limits in a government program if the restrictions on 
participation are reasonable in light of the purpose of the program, and the choice offered 
is non-coercive.
129
  The Christian Legal Society’s choice here is almost identical:  in 
order to receive funds from the government, the private group must comply with the 
state’s non-discrimination policies.  In this case, Hastings is neither forcing the Christian 
Legal Society to accept particular members nor forcing it to endorse beliefs that it would 
not otherwise endorse.
130
  Rather, the Hastings policy makes certain benefits available to 
the Christian Legal Society, if they comply with a standard, viewpoint-neutral 
nondiscrimination policy; the Christian Legal Society has complete authority to choose to 
forgo the modest benefits if it does not wish to comply with the conditions imposed.
131
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III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.      Analysis and Prediction 
 As stated in the Petitioner’s brief to the Supreme Court, the issue at hand is, 
“[w]hether the Constitution permits a public university law school to exclude a religious 
student organization from a forum of speech solely because the group requires its officers 
and voting members to share its core religious commitments.”132  In granting certiorari 
for this case, the United Supreme Court will settle a split between the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits.  While the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision for Hastings in 
this case, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Christian Legal Society chapter at the 
Southern Illinois University School of Law (“SIU”) in a case almost identical to the one 
at bar.
133
   
An important distinction between this case and Christian Legal Society v. Walker 
that the Christian Legal Society fails to acknowledge, however, is that SIU did not grant 
the group any access to school facilities or communication.
134
  The Seventh Circuit 
discussed, at length, the similarities between Walker and Healy v. James,
135
 because in 
both instances, the excluded groups were effectively “frozen out… of their 
universities.”136  In the case at bar, it is already established—and acknowledged by the 
Christian Legal Society—that the school has continued to allow the group to meet on 
campus, and has provided several channels of communication to the group.  The ultimate 
treatment of the groups on each campus was vastly different.  Thus, the Christian Legal 
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Society’s contention that these two cases are identical and that these two Circuit court 
decisions are precisely in contrast with each other is not accurate. 
Hastings has maintained that the group may exist, thrive, and have access to 
certain University facilities and communications, regardless of who it includes or 
excludes.
137
  This is in direct conflict with the Christian Legal Society’s reliance on the 
Healy precedent, and its claim that denial of its application is “presumptively 
unconstitutional.”138  As Hastings points out in its brief,  
The Court’s use of the term “prior restraint” was explicitly tied to 
the fact that the college in that case had not just refused to 
recognize the student group at issue—it systematically sought to 
prevent the group from existing on campus, even going so far as to 
disband an informal meeting of the group in a “campus coffee 
shop.”139 
 
Unlike in Healy and Walker, Hastings has not attempted to forbid the Christian Legal 
Society from existing and thriving on campus.  Therefore, the denial of official 
recognition cannot be presumptively unconstitutional or a “prior restraint” on the group’s 
expression of its First Amendment rights. 
 The Ninth Circuit correctly applied the same legal reasoning in this case 
that it did in Truth v. Kent.
140
  Though the school in Truth is a high school, as opposed to 
a public law school like Hastings, the legal issues are still comparable.  As in Truth, 
Hastings requires that any group that receives RSO status welcome all students to vote 
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and fully participate.  Kent School District had the same requirements, which the Ninth 
Circuit deemed viewpoint-neutral and reasonable.
141
 
Returning to the various legal claims, the Court must ultimately determine the 
nature of the forum Hastings has created, whether enforcement of the policy is viewpoint-
neutral or viewpoint-discriminatory, and whether, in the light of the answers to the first 
two questions, the student members of the Christian Legal Society have had their First 
Amendment rights unconstitutionally infringed upon. 
 The Christian Legal Society contends in its introduction that Hastings has created 
an “open public forum,” while simultaneously equating its current situation to the 
production of newspapers in Rosenberger.  Unlike Rosenberger, Hastings is not 
systematically denying RSO applications for all religious groups.  On the contrary, many 
groups—including the previous form of the Christian Legal Society—have enjoyed the 
rights and benefits of RSO status at Hastings for years.  In Rosenberger, the school’s 
decision was inherently viewpoint-discriminatory because the school refused to provide 
the funds based solely on the fact that it was a religious newspaper, which constituted 
prohibited religious activity within the school’s definition.142  On the contrary, Hastings’ 
denial of funds to the Christian Legal Society was based upon a policy that controls the 
conduct of every RSO.  Hastings is not trying to regulate the content of the message the 
group, but rather its conduct in prohibiting certain students from fully participating in its 
organization. 
 Further, simply recognizing that the Christian Legal Society has a constitutional 
right to expressive association does not require that Hastings provide it funding.  The 
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United States Supreme Court upheld, in Board of Regents v. Southworth,
143
 that it is 
constitutionally permissible for public schools to have mandatory student activity fees, 
used to fund official student organizations.  However, the Court was very clear that it is 
only constitutional if neutrally applied.
144
  Under the Southworth framework, if a school 
has a viewpoint-neutral policy for determining which student groups are eligible for 
funding, it is constitutionally permissible to both collect the funds, and distribute them to 
those groups who comport to the neutral standards the school sets forth. 
Accordingly, the fact that Hastings provides funding for other, similar groups is 
not determinative in whether it must provide like funding for all groups.  Having a 
constitutionally protected right to something does not then require that the government 
subsidize, or fund, that right.  Though women have a constitutionally protected right to an 
abortion, public hospitals are not constitutionally required to offer the services, nor are 
the government required to “fund advocacy of abortion, even if it funds advocacy of 
other options for pregnant women.”145  The only exception to this rule is in cases of 
traditionally public forums of speech.
146
  Here, it is evident that the Court will hold that 
Hastings has created a limited public forum, and because its imposed requirements are 
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reasonable to reach its goals for the forum, Hastings is therefore not presumptively 
required to fund the expressive association.   
 Once the Supreme Court establishes there is a limited public forum, and the 
school is using a viewpoint-neutral policy, the court must finally apply a balancing test to 
ensure that the policy is both reasonable and non-coercive in its application.  That is, a 
group’s presumption of freedom of expressive association can be limited by a reasonable 
and non-coercive government interest, especially when the speech forum has been limited 
with a particular interest in mind.
147
  As has been established, Hastings’ interest in 
recognizing various organizations is to provide auxiliary learning experiences to all of its 
students, regardless of beliefs or status.  The government’s interest in this matter goes 
beyond Hastings’ decision; the state of California has prohibited public school funds 
from being distributed to “any program or activity” that discriminates on a variety of 
bases, including sexual orientation and religion.
148
  It is undoubtedly reasonable that the 
government has an interest in ensuring public funds are not used at the expense of any 
group or class of persons. 
 On the issue of coercion, the Christian Legal Society relies heavily on the Court’s 
decision in Boy Scouts v. Dale.
149
  However, this case is readily distinguishable from the 
one at bar.  In Dale, the New Jersey courts sought to compel the Boy Scouts to include 
Dale, an openly gay man, as a leader in the organization due to its public 
accommodations laws.
150
  Contrary to the situation here, the Boy Scouts’ freedom of 
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expressive association would have, indeed, been infringed upon because of the lack of 
choice in the matter.  Here, the Christian Legal Society’s freedom of expressive 
association is not hindered in any way.  If the group has a religious objection to persons 
that engage in “homosexual activity,” they absolutely have the First Amendment right to 
exclude such people from representing the group in a leadership capacity.  However, they 
cannot believe, and the Court should not compel, Hastings from endorsing that belief via 
a “special exception” to a universally applied policy.   
The Christian Legal Society’s First Amendment rights do not guarantee them the 
right to access a limited public forum when the enforcement of its beliefs violate a 
viewpoint-neutral prerequisite for access to the forum.
151
  The Boy Scouts were initially 
given no option to define their organization’s leadership.  Here, the Christian Legal 
Society is free to do so—and has done so since its petition was denied. 
 The Boy Scouts of America, in fact, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the 
Christian Legal Society because of its history with this topic.
152
  The Boy Scouts break 
down the Dale decision and state, “[t]he membership decisions of an association are 
constitutionally protected if: (1) the association is expressive, and (2) the state’s forced 
inclusion of an unwanted person in the association affects in a significant way the 
                                                     
151
 Battaglia, supra note 147, at 395.  
152
 Brief of Amicus Curiae Boy Scouts of America in Support of Petitioner at 2, Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. argued Apr. 19, 2010).  [hereinafter Boy Scouts Brief].  
In its brief, the Boy Scouts of America state that they have two interests in participating as an 
amicus in this case: “First, the principle stated in Dale that the state may not invole 
nondiscrimination rules to force unwanted members on an expressive association is crucial to 
Boy Scouts.  Second, the principle stated in Rosenbergerer [] that the state cannot exclude an 
expressive association from a forum for speech on the basis of the association’s speech is crucial 
to Boy Scouts.  The same violation of associational rights occurs if the state forces an unwanted 
member on the association by direct regulation or by threatened exclusion from a forum for 
speech.” 
27 
 
association’s ability to express itself.”153  The brief continues on to qualify those elements 
with an exception, but Hastings does not even need it.  The state is not forcing the 
Christian Legal Society to include anyone.   
Further, even if the Court finds that the withholding of funds is overly coercive, 
this chapter of the Christian Legal Society, much like many other chapters around the 
country, cannot show that a gay or lesbian student’s full involvement in the organization 
would hinder its message in a significant way.  Nothing on the record indicates that that 
the Christian Legal Society’s mission or activity would be hindered by abiding by 
Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy.  On the contrary, Hastings’ chapter of the Christian 
Legal Society had an openly lesbian student member, as recently as the 2003-2004 
academic school year.
154
  During the fact-finding portion of the trial, the attorney for the 
Christian Legal Society even stated that,  
the point is not that that student changed the contents of the 
organization’s expression by her participation.  She did not.  She 
simply exchanged views.  They learned from each other as 
students in any club should.  They respect one another.  But the 
contents and expression of [the Christian Legal Society] at 
Hastings was not changed in any way nor could it have been.
155
 
 
The Christian Legal Society conceded that its ability to express itself was not and could 
not have been altered by the presence of a gay or lesbian student.  The standard in Dale is 
simply not met in this case. 
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B.   Conclusion 
The First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, religion and expressive 
association are two of the most fundamental rights this country holds dear.  However, as 
a country, we simultaneously recognize certain situations where the government has valid 
concerns and interests that make these rights in absolute.  A public university’s interest in 
guaranteeing that all students have equal opportunities to engage in meaningful 
extracurricular activities is, indeed, one of them.   
 Where the government limits a public speech forum, it must do so neutrally and 
across-the-board.
156
  However, such truly viewpoint-neutral limitations on free speech are 
constitutional if they further the goals of limiting the forum and are reasonably and non-
coercively applied.  Here, the Hastings Law School requires student organizations to 
comply with a standard non-discrimination policy to gain full recognition and utilize 
some specific benefits of such recognition.  Because the language of the policy must 
necessarily be included in the bylaws of every organization, because it reasonably 
enables the school to make certain that all students have full access to organizations and 
educational opportunities, and because it is the least coercive and least-limiting method 
possible, the Supreme Court of the United States must affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in finding the policy constitutional.   
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